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In the Second Critique, Kant criticizes the Stoics for ‘straining the moral capacities of a 
human being … far beyond all the limits of his nature’ (CPrR, 5: 127.2-3). The Stoic 
conception of virtue is unfit for human beings, since the ideal Stoic agent, the sage, is 
presented as a ‘divinity’, an entity ‘independent of nature’ for whom happiness is of no 
special relevance (5: 126.14-127.16). In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant warns of the 
‘fantastically virtuous’ character who is ‘too virtuous’ and thinks that duty has to be 
considered in every decision. This would turn virtue into a ‘tyranny’ (MM, 6: 409.13-19).1 
Kant thinks that a moral theory can be criticized, if, due to an unrealistic conception of human 
capabilities, it prescribes that finite human beings achieve an impossible ideal, or if it requires 
that agents exhaust themselves thinking constantly about small or morally insignificant 
matters as if they constituted genuine moral quandaries. Kant here levels a version of what we 
nowadays would call the Overdemandingness Objection. 
There are clear indications that Kant himself conceives of his own theory as not threatened by 
any of these and related problems. In the context of his deduction in Groundwork III, he 
expresses the view that moral oughts are rational willings, i.e. that an agent, insofar as she is 
rational, does not even experience morality as a demand (G, 4: 455.7-9) – an optimism that 
certainly can be called ‘astonishing’ (Timmermann 2007: 143). Kant also states that how 
much an agent should extend his beneficence ‘must be left to each to decide for himself’ 
(MM, 6: 393.28-29). He seems to think that moral demands, correctly understood, leave 
ample room for non-moral (though never for immoral) activities. In his late works, Kant even 
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indicates that morality and happiness can go together quite well (Rel, 6: 24n.26-27; MM, 6: 
484.20-29; Ped, 9: 485.5-6), and that morality can be a source of happiness (MM, 6: 378.8-
18). 
Nonetheless, predecessors of our current debate on overdemandingness and related objections 
were already levelled against Kant, for instance, by Hegel (1991: §135; 1976: V.C.c., VI.C.a-
b). Hegel (1976: VI.C.a) argues that, according to Kant’s transcendental idealism, there is 
necessarily ‘disharmony’ between duty and nature and moral agents’ good intentions are thus 
frequently frustrated. A state of harmony between duty and nature, which would enable agents 
to perform moral actions in the world of experience, is only a postulate and the actualization 
of this harmony is eternally deferred. According to Hegel, Kantian morality thus requires 
agents to act in a metaphysically impossible way, namely, to actualize their pure practical 
reason in a sensuous world that leaves no room for such an exercise. This constitutes a form 
of overdemandingness, since agents are supposedly morally required to go beyond what we 
can reasonably expect of them as finite agents and even beyond what they can do, period. 
There is currently growing interest in the limits of morality and related topics such as Ought 
Implies Can (e.g. van Ackeren and Kühler 2016), supererogation and feasibility. In particular, 
the debate on (over-)demandingness has evolved greatly over the last decade. We can 
distinguish two strands of this debate, namely, one concerning demandingness and one 
concerning overdemandingness. The debate on demandingness addresses questions 
concerning what demandingness, understood as a conflict between morality and self-interest, 
is, and whether these conflicts are conceptually necessary (Finlay 2008), empirically 
necessary in the sense of being necessary given the current conditions of the world (Crisp 
1996), or rather impossible as ancient eudaemonists have claimed.  
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The debate on overdemandingness and related objections against normative moral theories 
focuses on questions such as whether and how we can distinguish between plausible and 
excessive demands; which aspects or claims of a normative theory are the sources of 
overdemandingness; and whether we should revise theories which make excessive demands 
or even reject them for being unfit for human agents (see Hooker 2009, Scheffler 1992). 
There is currently no well-established family tree that captures the main variants of 
overdemandingness objections, such as the integrity objection (Williams 1985) as well as 
problems pertaining to a potential excessive scope of morality (Fishkin 1982), unfairness 
(Murphy 1993), psychological difficulty (McElwee 2016) or confinement (Benn 2016). 
Furthermore, there are different ways of establishing a demarcation line between acceptable 
demandingness and overdemandingness: a level of well-being that an agent always has a 
prerogative to preserve, a fixed limit to the total amount of sacrifice that can be required of 
agents for the sake of morality, certain goods that morality cannot require that we give up, etc. 
The accusation that a theory is overdemanding in its current form is commonly considered as 
a reaction to certain forms of consequentialism and rescue principles.2 It is important to note 
though, that this represents a very restricted perspective on the demandingness debate. A 
number of central and influential attacks on modern ethical theories, for instance by Wolf 
(1982) and Williams (1985), are directed against Kantianism as well as consequentialism. 
Both Kantianism and consequentialism are criticized for being overly detached from our 
moral experiences and from what gives our lives meaning. Modern ethical theories, according 
to their critics, threaten to neglect or diminish the importance of personal ground projects, 
goals and values or the weight of personal non-moral reasons. Williams even took Kant to be 
the grandfather of the infamous modern morality-system of which utilitarianism is just a 
variant and which generally is overdemanding (1985, esp.ch.10). 
 4 
 
Though Kantian ethics was an important opponent for Williams, Wolf, Foot, etc., the debates 
on demandingness and overdemandingness seem to have lost interest in Kantian ethics, until a 
decade or so ago.3 Recently, however, the debate has returned to Kant. A number of 
philosophers have proposed that if overdemandingness is a problem for an ethical theory, 
Kant is in a relatively strong position to avoid overdemandingness problems. Igneski (2008) 
argues that, in a Kantian framework, agents must have free space to set and pursue their own 
personal ends. If autonomy ‘is something we truly value then we should not be required to 
give it up ourselves’ (ibid.: 441). Pinheiro Walla (2015) argues that Kant’s duty of 
beneficence has built-in limitations on how much is required of agents. Stohr (2011: 46) even 
goes so far as to claim that utilitarians could criticize Kant for being underdemanding or that 
‘Kantianism is not adequately demanding when it comes to beneficence’.4  
There are at least three reasons why a more in-depth discussion of Kant and (over-
)demandingness, as the authors in the present exchange provide it, is still a desideratum. 
Firstly, consequentialists frequently point out that overdemandingness is not a potential 
problem for them alone but also for Kantians. Singer and Lazari-Radek (2014: 324) recently 
claimed that Kantian theory is highly demanding, but as evidence they only vaguely refer to 
Ashford’s (2000, 2003) and Ashford’s and Mulgan’s (2012) discussion of the demandingness 
of contractualism. Likewise, Mulgan (2001: 5-6) charges Kant with overdemandingness, but 
his suggestions for how the debate could be applied to Kant are unspecific and brief and this 
makes it difficult to critically evaluate his assessment. Since overdemandingness is considered 
one of the main problems for consequentialism, a discussion of how Kant handles (over-




Secondly, unlike ancient eudaemonists Kant acknowledges that there can be conflicts between 
the demands of duty and the well-being of agents. Unlike the modern proponents of an 
overdemandingness objection, Kant does not necessarily take these conflicts to indicate that 
we have to alter what morality can demand of us. Kantian moral theory provides a different 
approach and different solutions to problems currently the subject-matter of a fierce debate.  
Thirdly, Kant assumes a richer picture of duties than just the requirement to do as much good 
as one can. In Kant’s ethical writings we find discussions of absolute prohibitions against 
forms of mistreatment and exploitation, as well as discussions of what agents owe to 
themselves and to loved ones. These duties are often overlooked in the current (over-
)demandingness debate and can enrich the conceptual framework of this debate.  
The current collection contains two new essays on Kant and (over-)demandingness and 
critical responses to the essays by leading scholars in the overdemandingness debate. The 
topics range from questions pertaining to the authority of morality, to latitude and the validity 
of the overdemandingness objection itself. Of the main papers, Jens Timmermann is open to 
the possibility that Kant’s ethics is indeed very demanding but maintains that this does not 
constitute a problem for Kant. Unlike many other Kantians he does not seek to defend Kant’s 
ethics via appeal to latitude but rather pursues a number of underexplored options, pertaining 
to how duty is imposed on agents, that Kantian ethics does not demand that we always 
perform the morally optimal action, and that Kant acknowledges that agents must undergo a 
process of moral development. The second paper discusses Kant’s strong version of moral 
rationalism, which Marcel van Ackeren and Martin Sticker refer to as ‘silencing’. They argue 
that silencing can make perfect duties very demanding. However, silencing does not require 
that agents do all they can in the case of imperfect duties. Once more, this is a strategy that 







1 The context of this attack is Kant’s discussion of the status of adiaphora – see Rel, 6: 23n.; 
MM, 6: 222.35-223.17, 409.13-19; L-Eth Vigil, 27: 512.14-29. The following abbreviations 
are used: G: Groundwork, CPrR: Critique of Practical Reason, Rel: Religion, MM: 
Metaphysics of Morals, Ped: Pedagogy, L-Eth Vigil: Lecture notes Vigilantius. Our 
translations follow Kant (1996). 
2 The most influential of these rescue principles is presented in Singer (1972). See Kagan 
(1989) for an early influential defense of consequentialism against the overdemandingness 
objection. 
3 An exception is an older paper by O’Neill (1993: 459) in which she argues that Kantianism 
is significantly less demanding than utilitarianism since Kant’s focus is on omitting acts of 
injustice, not on promoting ends. 
4 Furthermore, see recent papers on the topic by Timmermann (2005), O’Neill (2009), Vogt 
(2008). These papers all argue that Kant’s ethics is not overdemanding or they at least suggest 
such a conclusion. An exception is van Ackeren and Sticker (2015), who argue that perfect 
duties can be criticized for their demandingness. 
5 Work on this special issue was on the part of Marcel van Ackeren funded by the Gerda-
Henkel-Stiftung and on the part of Martin Sticker funded by the Irish Research Council. The 
editors wish to thank Richard Aquila for organizing a thorough and impressively efficient 
blind review process. Furthermore, the editors wish to thank an anonymous referee for 
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